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I. Introduction
On July 27, 1995, the International Association of Machinists (IAM), the United Auto
Workers (UAW), and the United Steelworkers (USW), three of the largest industrial
unions in North America, announced their intent to merge.' This merger would create
the largest union in the North American labor movement.-^
Since the announcement, the IAM, UAW, and USW have quietly been negotiat-
ing a merger agreement. The unions originally set the year 2000 as the target for com-
pletion of the merger, leaving a five-year period in which to finalize the details (USW,
1995). In October 1998, the President ofthe IAM suggested that the merger would not
be completed before 2002 (Likely Completion, 1998). By all indications, the unions
will need this extra time to come to an agreement.
Tbe unification of the UAW, USW, and IAM, if realized, would be an important
and historic event in the history of the modem American labor movement for several
reasons. First, the sheer size of the union to be created, probably over two million mem-
bers, and the potential that such a mega-union has for concentrating resources and
power in pursuit of its goals, is significant. Second, unlike many of the "defensive"
union mergers and affiliations in recent years that have involved unions that were no
longer viable, this merger appears to be more of an "offensive" merger, involving unions
that have remained relatively stable in recent years. And third, if this merger is com-
pleted, it may provide a model for other American unions at a time when the labor
movement is going through a period of significant restructuring.
Nonetheless, a merger of the type proposed is a very complex undertaking that
will necessarily involve fundamental changes in the governing structures, policies, and
cultures of the unions involved. The organizations and their leaders must overcome a
number of very formidable hurdles if the merger is to be consummated.
We examine the many difficult issues facing the IAM, UAW, and USW as tbey
move toward the creation of a single organization. In order to place this merger in con-
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text, the larger issue of mergers in the American labor movement will be addressed, as
will the origins and history of each ofthe three unions. The specific issues confronting
the unions will be examined in three categories — structure, administration, and func-
tions and services. We conclude with an assessment of the current status of the unifi-
cation effort and the prospects for its realization.
IL The Movement to Merge
Mergers are not new to the American labor movement. In fact, the first union mergers
quickly followed the emergence ofthe first viable labor organizations in the early 1800s.
As the labor movement developed, one of its earliest national leaders, Samuel Gompers,
urged unions to merge in order to consolidate resources and eliminate jurisdictional
disputes (Chaison, 1986).
Labor organizations, like their counterparts in business, have been continuously
restructuring and regrouping into larger, more complex structures ever since. From
1900 to 1959, union mergers averaged two per year, increasing to an annual rate of 2.7
per year from 1960 to 1979. From 1980 to 1998, the merger rate rose to four per year
(Chaison, 1980, 1982, 1998).
Mucb of the literature on mergers focuses on why and under what circumstances
unions merge (Brooks and Gamm, 1979; Chitayat, 1979). One of the major infiuences
cited is the business cycle. Observers agree that unions are more willing to merge when
they face difficult times (Freeman and Brittan, 1977). Shrinking union membership and
a worsening political climate have also encouraged unions to combine forces. A further,
more recent incentive is the rise of global conglomerates which dwarf the size and rel-
ative bargaining power of unions.
Mergers, themselves, have taken many different forms and their impact on the
structure and functions ofthe merging organizations has varied widely. Chaison (1986)
points out that most mergers take place between a larger and a smaller organization. He
terms these mergers "absorptions." The affiliation of smaller, independent public
employee unions with the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) in recent
years are examples of this type of merger. The IAM, UAW, and USW each "absorbed"
a number of smaller unions before contemplating a merger with one another.
More difficult to achieve, and less common, are mergers of unions of equal or
comparable size and power. Chaison (1986) refers to these mergers as "amalgama-
tions." The most significant merger of this type in recent years involved the Amalga-
mated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) and the International Ladies
Garment Workers Union (ILGWU). They joined together in 1995 to create the Union
of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE!). In another recent amal-
gamation, the United Paperworkers (UPIU) and the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Work-
ers (OCAW) merged to form the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers
Union (PACE).
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There have been a number of "near-amalgamations" in recent years, including the
efforts of the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation of
Teachers (AFT) to form one, unified, education union and an attempt to merge the
Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and the American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists (AFTRA). After decades of negotiations, both reached merger agreements which
were rejected by their memberships. These two cases demonstrate the difficulties unions
face when trying to meld the structures and cultures of different, usually highly polit-
ical, organizations in which members have the final say.
III. The Unification Proposal and Process
The IAM, UAW, and USW announced their intention to merge by releasing a "Unity
Statement" in July 1995. The statement began:
To better win a secure and prosperous future for working men and women in the
global economy of the twenty-first century, the IAM, the UAW, and the USWA hereby
agree to combine our individual strength. By this declaration, we pledge to unite the
membership and the resources of our three great unions into a new, two million mem-
ber strong, union by the year 2000 (USW, 1995).
Shortly after tbe unions announced tbeir intention to merge, they formed three
committees that would be central to the unification process. The International Presi-
dent's Committee includes the President of each union and one of his top assistants. The
Committee meets regularly to study and discuss "all aspects of unification including
each union's headquarters operations and the major programs of the International
unions, like organizing, political action, legislative, and communications" (IAM, 1996).
The Finance Committee consists ofthe Secretary-Treasurers ofthe three unions. Their
focus is on the financial operations of each union, including the dues structures, report-
ing procedures, and accounting and budget processes, among others. The third stand-
ing committee is the Constitution Committee. This Committee is composed of an
International Vice-President from each union and other staff with expertise in this area.
Its mandate is the drafting of a new constitution for the unified union (IAM, 1996).
In the spring of 1996, the three unions announced the creation of a 54-member
General Membership Advisory Committee. The Committee includes 18 local leaders
from each union. They will reportedly "work closely with the three presidents, testing
ideas and offering suggestions from the general membership of each of the unions"
(USW, Unification News, 1996).
In a June 1999 press release, the Presidents ofthe three unions stated that, because
of their more similar structures, "the UAW and the USW will take the next step in the
Unification process by conducting immediate discussions to join their two unions
together" (IAM, 1999). They also announced that discussions would continue with the
IAM toward "the ultimate goal of reaching Unification of all three unions" (IAM, 1999).
The constitutional conventions of each union will have the final say on any merger
agreement negotiated by the unions' leadership. Ratification could occur at regularly
scheduled conventions or at conventions specifically called for that purpose.
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IV. The Unions
The IAM. The IAM traces its roots back to the Machinists and Blacksmiths Union
founded in 1859. The IAM was conceived by railroad machinists as a craft union and
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1895. In the 1930s it began
to organize the emerging aerospace industry (IAM, 1998).
Over the years the union has expanded beyond the railway industry to include
workers from the auto and auto parts, wood and paper, electronics, construction, and
general manufacturing industries. The largest portion of its membership, however, cur-
rently works in the defense and aerospace industry (IAM, 1998). In 1997 the union
reported a total membership of 729,986, approximately 40,000 of whom are Canadian
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1997a; UAW, 1998).
Much of the power and authority in the IAM is invested in the local and district
lodges. The somewhat decentralized structure of the union refiects its origins as a craft
union. The IAM's International (or Grand Lodge) officers are elected by membership
referendum (IAM, Constitution, 1997). George Kourpias was the president of tbe union
when the unification proposal was announced in 1995. Kourpias retired in 1997 and was
replaced by Tbomas Buffenbarger, an IAM Vice-President since 1993 (Boyer, 1997).
The UAW. The UAW was chartered by the AFL in 1935, but left shortly after to
affiliate with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The UAW-CIO made sig-
nificant strides in organizing the American auto industry in the late 1930s and early
1940s. In 1955, the UAW became a part of the AFL-CIO, when the two federations
merged, only to leave thirteen years later over disagreements with the federation's poli-
cies and political positions. In 1981 the UAW rejoined the labor federation.
Today, the largest segment ofthe UAW's membership still works in the auto, auto
parts, and truck industries. However, the union also has sizable memberships in the
agricultural implement, aerospace, and defense industries, as well as in miscellaneous
industrial and service occupations. In 1986 most ofthe union's Canadian members left
to form the Canadian Auto Workers union (CAW). Tbe UAW's membership stood at
767,200 in 1997, only roughly 4,000 of whom were Canadian (U.S. Department of
Labor, 1997b; UAW, 1998).
Consistent with its CIO roots, the UAW has a somewhat centralized structure,
with the International and regional levels retaining significant authority. The union
elects its president through a vote of delegates at its triennial International convention.
Steve Yokich has served as UAW President since 1995.
The USW. The USW had its origins as the Steel Workers Organizing Committee
(SWOC), a group formed by the CIO in 1936. After successfully organizing much of
the basic steel industry, SWOC officially became the USW in 1942. During World War
II and the post-war years, the USW broadened itsjurisdiction to include the production
and fabrication of other metals. Over the years the union's membersbip grew, at least
partly due to a series of mergers. In 1997, the union reported a total membership of
666,704 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1997c). Approximately 170,000 of the USW's
membership resides in Canada (UAW, 1996).
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As a creation of the CIO, the USW's structure, like the UAW's, is somewhat cen-
tralized, at least compared to many former AFL unions. The union elects their Inter-
national officers by referendum. Its current president is George Becker who was first
elected in 1994 (USW, 1999).
V. Merger Issues
Structure. Historically, the most difficult issue for merging unions to resolve, particu-
larly in a merger of equals, has been differences in formal structure.^ Structural differ-
ences are, in fact, one of the main reasons why the long contemplated AFT-NEA and
AFTRA-SAG mergers have not been completed.
In the case of the IAM-UAW-USW unification, one of the crucial structural issues
that must be resolved is the method for electing national officers. The IAM and the
USW both elect their top officers by a secret ballot referendum of the membership,
while the UAW conducts its national elections by a vote of delegates to its convention.
Resistance to the referendum method is strong among the UAW leadership. This oppo-
sition is partly a function of the fact that challengers to the incumbent leadersbip (from
opponents of Walter Reuther to the recent "New Directions" movement) have always
campaigned for a referendum vote. As recently as the 1998 UAW Convention, the
union's leadership steadfastly supported convention election, going so far as to dis-
tribute a document titled "The UAW Convention System Reaffirmed" in opposition to
a resolution calling for referendum elections (UAW, 1998).
A union's Executive Board is normally the top decision-making body in the organ-
ization between conventions. The manner in which tbe IAM, UAW, and USW elect
members to their Boards is another fundamental difference between the unions. In the
UAW and USW, tbe International Executive Boards are composed of the International
officers and the Directors of the unions' intermediate bodies."* The UAW calls these
bodies Regions; the USW calls them Districts. In the UAW, each Regional Director is
elected at the convention by the delegates from his or her region. In tbe USW, District
Directors are elected by a referendum vote of the members of each individual District.
Because Regional and District Director elections coincide with the elections of the
International officers, candidates for both offices usually run on common slates.
In the IAM, Executive Council members include the International President, the
General Secretary-Treasurer, and seven General Vice-Presidents. The General Vice-
Presidents are elected at-large by the entire membership, usually on a slate with the
President and Secretary-Treasurer. Once elected, the General Vice Presidents are
assigned to either a geographic "territory" or industry departments by the President.
Unions give national union presidents varying degrees of freedom to act on sig-
nificant matters without the approval of the union's Executive Board or its member-
ship. The USW President appears to have somewhat more extensive powers than his
counterparts in the IAM or UAW. Not only does be have wide discretion in the hiring,
assignment, and firing of staff (as do the IAM and UAW presidents), but he also has sole
authority to place locals under trusteeship and to authorize strikes. In the IAM, the
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President can act alone to put locals into trusteeship, but must have the agreement of
the Executive Council to call off a strike. In the UAW, both of these actions must have
the approval of the Executive Board.
Another important issue that the three unions must resolve if unification is to occur
involves the distribution of decision-making power across the union. The UAW and the
USW organizational structures are based on a "CIO" model of centralized administra-
tion wbere more of the decision-making power is entrusted to the International than it
is in a more decentralized union like the IAM. For example, in the UAW and the USW,
all headquarters and field staff are appointed by tbe International Presidents. In the
IAM, the President appoints headquarters staff and some field staff (called Grand Lodge
Representatives), but the majority of full-time field staff (usually called business rep-
resentatives) are elected by the members in the local and district lodges they service.
Another distinguishing feature of union structure is the right of members and offi-
cers to appeal actions taken by tbe national union. The Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) requires that national unions have an intemal appeals
process. In almost all unions, the procedure culminates in a decision by delegates to tbe
national union convention. This is the case in the IAM and the USW. In the UAW, how-
ever, members have the right to take such appeals to the UAW Public Review Board
(PRB). The PRB, an invention of Walter Reuther, is a panel of distinguished academ-
ics who are known as advocates for the rights of union members. The PRB is a point
of great pride and the UAW will most probably be very reluctant to give it up. On the
other hand, allowing outsiders to make important decisions regarding union policies is
a practice the other two unions would probably find very difficult to accept.
Another structural difference between the three unions involves the scope of mem-
bership representation. The IAM and the USW are truly International unions as they
have a significant number of members in Canada, while the UAW has only a few mem-
bers north of the border since the Canadian Auto Workers seceded from the union.
The unions also differ in terms of the membership status and rights of retirees. In
the UAW, retired members have full voting rights, while in the IAM retirees can vote
in all union elections, except those that directly involve collective bargaining (such as
contract ratifications). In the USW, retirees do not have any rights to participate in union
activities. They do, however, have auxiliary organizations tbat allow them to participate
in union-related, but separate, activities.
As Table 1 suggests, membership dues in the three unions are not significantly
different, although the formulas for calculating dues vary. There is, however, a signif-
icant difference in the way tbe unions' constitutions allocate dues monies across the
organizations. The IAM, refiecting its greater degree of local autonomy and adminis-
trative decentralization, allows local unions to collect the dues and keep half of the
total. Similarly, the UAW requires that locals collect all dues and turn over 62 percent
to the national union. In the USW, the locals collect the dues but turn all monies over
to the international which then returns 44 percent to the local. All three unions mandate
that a specific part of members' dues be allocated to a strike fund. However, the UAW
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directs 30 percent of total dues collected into such a fund, far more than either the IAM
(2.5 percent) or the USW (7.0 percent).
A final governance issue that will need to be resolved in union merger negotiations
is the compensation for elected national officers. While the IAM's officers are presently
paid higher salaries than their counterparts in the UAW and the USW, the difference is
not substantial (Table 2). Given that the elected officers of a unified merger are going
to be overseeing a much larger organization, it is likely that salaries in the new union
will be higher than those currently paid in any of the three unions.
Administration. Tbe process of bringing together three organizations, each with
several hundred thousand members, a full complement of elected officers, more than a
thousand employees, as well as headquarters buildings, education centers, and other
assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars is a huge and complicated undertaking.
Three of the most significant administrative issues the IAM, UAW, and USW must
wrestle with are how to merge the financial assets of the unions, how to consolidate the
unions' staffs, and what to do with tbe existing headquarters buildings and education
centers of the three unions.
Table 1
Dues Structure
Minimum Monthly
Membership Dues
Local Share
Strike Fund
Source: Union Constitutions:
President
Sec.-Treas.
Vice-Presidents
District/Regional
IAM
Two (2) times
average hourly pay
50 percent
2.5 percent
UAW
Two (2)
hours pay
38 percent
30 percent
IAM, 1997; UAW, 1998; USW, 1996.
Compensation
IAM
138,028
127,990
112,932
n.a.
Table 2
USW
1.39% of monthly earnings;
not to exceed 2.5% of
average hourly earnings
44 percent
7 percent
of International Officers
UAW
106,077
97,174
96,697
84,795
USW
105,000
85,000
85,000
70,000
Source: Union Constitutions: IAM, 1997; UAW, 1998; USW, 1996.
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An analysis of tbe 1997 LM-2 reports filed witb tbe Department of Labor reveals
tbat eacb of tbe tbree unions brings considerable financial assets to tbe unification. How-
ever, wbile tbe USW and tbe IAM reported $184 million and $192 million in net assets
(total assets minus total liabilities) respectively, at tbe end of 1997, tbe UAW reported
$968 million (Table 3). Most of tbe difference is in tbe amount of U.S. treasury securi-
ties beld by tbe unions. Tbe UAW bas between $500 and $600 million more in tbese
boldings tban eitber tbe IAM or tbe USW. Tbe moneys kept in treasury securities report-
edly constitute tbe union's strike funds (Department of Labor, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c).
Tbe financial situation of tbe tbree unions raises a number of important issues.
Tbe balance sbeets suggest tbat over tbe years tbe UAW bas been able to accumulate a
very bealtby strike fund. The money in tbis fund ultimately came from members' dues
and from income generated from tbe investment of tbis money. If tbe assets of tbe tbree
unions were merged, tbe members of tbe USW and tbe IAM would benefit greatly from
a significantly enbanced strike fund. Members of tbe UAW migbt resent putting sig-
nificantly more money into tbe collective pot tban tbe otber two unions combined. How-
ever, in interviews, officials of all tbree unions downplayed tbe importance of tbe
financial disparity, variously suggesting tbat tbe availability of sucb a strike fund would
increase tbe bargaining power of all segments of tbe new union and tbat supporting fel-
low trade unionists on strike is a basic value tbat all tbe unions sbare.^
Even if tbis is tbe case and tbe strike funds are taken out of tbe equation, tbe UAW,
as of December 31, 1997, had net assets of approximately $359 million compared to
$177 million and $115 million for tbe IAM and the USW, respectively. Tbis significant
imbalance in assets suggests tbat at least in a financial sense, the proposed unification
does not involve co-equal parties. It also suggests tbat wben it comes time to thrash out
solutions to the difficult issues facing tbe parties, one union may bave significantly
more leverage than the other two (Department of Labor, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c).
It is difficult to determine tbe number of employees working for the three unions
since the UAW and the USW consider all headquarters and District/Regional staff to
be employees of tbe International union, wbile tbe IAM considers only tbose employ-
Table 3
IAM, UAW, and USW Finances, 1997
IAM
UAW
USW
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, LM-2 Reports, 1997
Total
Assets
$193,486,058
$974,032,622
$319,312,750
Total
Liabilities
$1,097,752
$6,032,250
$135,679,034
Net
Assets
$192,388,306
$968,000,372
$183,633,716
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ees based at its beadquarters to be employed by tbe International or Grand Lodge. For
example, in their 1997 LM-2 reports, the UAW and the USW reported 1,640 and 1,053
professional, technical, and clerical non-elected employees as working for tbe respec-
tive International unions. Tbe IAM reported only 286.
Despite tbe differences in tbeir structures, it is probably safe to assume tbat the
total number of full-time employees working for tbe IAM approacbes the number
reported by tbe UAW and USW. Tbis suggests that a total of well over 3,000 employ-
ees are currently on the payrolls of the three unions. The new union will, by necessity,
need to reconfigure staff assignments for many of tbese employees. At tbe beadquarters
level, for example, tbe merged union will need to combine support departments in tbe
three unions (organizing, research, education, etc.) into one department. The three field
staffs will also need to be reorganized from tbree separate staffs into one cobesive unit.
One of tbe potential benefits of sucb a merger are tbe economies of scale. Tbis sug-
gests tbat tbe new union might be able to provide tbe same, or possibly better, services
witb sometbing less tban tbe total number of staff currently employed by tbe tbree unions.
Tbe leaders of tbe three unions are keenly aware of tbe concems tbe current staffs
bave about job security and about possible cbanges in job expectations. Tbe unions
bave stressed that unification is not analogous to a corporate merger in whicb down-
sizing tbe work force is one of tbe goals. Tbey bave also empbasized tbat tbere is going
to be enough work to do to keep most of the current staff working and no layoffs are
anticipated. Where necessary, the work force will probably be reduced by attrition.
Staff concems will likely remain, bowever, until tbe actual merger takes place.
Anotber related issue involves tbe development of unified employment policies.
Currently, all non-elected, non-supervisory employees of tbe unions (clerical, tecbni-
cal, and professional) are a part of one of a number of different staff unions. Tbe IAM
and tbe UAW botb bave one union for all beadquarters and field-based tecbnical and
professional staff and one union for beadquarters and field clerical workers. Tbe USW
has a Staff Representatives Union (SRU) for field staff and a separate union, USW
Local 3657, that includes all clerical, tecbnical, and professional employees at bead-
quarters and most clericals at tbe union's field offices. Tbe USW also bas separate
unions for clericals in its Canadian offices, clericals who worked for the United Rub-
ber Workers (URW) prior to merger, and clericals wbo worked for tbe Aluminum,
Brick, and Glass Workers (ABGW) before it merged with the USW.
While an examination of the LM-2s and the various current staff contracts reveals
differences in wage/salary levels, benefits, and working conditions, tbe differences do
not appear to be substantial. Working out uniform salary and benefit plans will proba-
bly not be an insurmountable challenge, although it is likely that the unified union will
have to use the highest salary and benefit levels currently being paid across the three
unions as a starting point. Others could tben be brougbt up to tbose levels.
In addition to establisbing consistent employment policies for the staff of tbe
merged organization, tbe new union will also bave to establisb a new intemal bargain-
ing structure. Certainly merging tbe nine current staff unions into a more manageable
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number is sometbing the three unions would like to see. However, legally, the decision
whether to merge these unions and their bargaining units is the staff unions', not the
employer unions'.
The process of merging employment policies and staff unions may be made
somewbat easier by tbe fact that at least one of the unions has substanfial experience
witb integrating tbe employment policies of different groups of staff. Tbe USW has,
since 1995, brought the staffs of the URW and the ABGW into their union. The URW
and the ABGW each had a separate staff union and contract for their professional and
clerical employees. The two unions' professional staff were integrated into the USW
Local 3657 and the SRU. The USW assumed the existing contracts for the clerical
workers and are in the process of integrating tbem into Local 3657. Previously, the
USW had absorbed staff and staff contracts from District 50, tbe Aluminum Workers,
and tbe Upbolsterers. The IAM and the UAW have also had some experience in this
area, but not nearly as much as the USW.
One last administrative issue that will need to be resolved involves tbe beadquar-
ters buildings and education centers maintained by the three unions. Solidarity House,
the UAW's headquarters, is located in Detroit and was built in 1951. The USW is
housed in a relatively modem building in Pittsburgb tbat became the union's head-
quarters in 1973. In 1992, the IAM left Washington, D.C. and built a new beadquarters
facility in the Maryland suburbs.
Tbe unions also have well-establisbed education centers. Tbe UAW's is located
at Black Lake, Micbigan, in the far northem reaches ofthe state. Established in 1970,
the facility is named the Walter and May Reutber Family Education Center. The
USW's Education Center, establisbed in 1978, is located at a mral site in southwest-
em Pennsylvania. The IAM has tbe newest facility. Tbe IAM opened its Education
Center on the Chesapeake Bay in southem Maryland in 1981. It was recently expanded
and renamed the William W. Winpisinger Education and Technology Center, after tbe
former IAM president.
The IAM, UAW, and USW have large financial investments in their beadquarters
and education facilities. Tbey also bave strong emotional attachments to them, as evi-
denced, in part, by tbe fact tbat the UAW and IAM education centers are named after
two ofthe most revered figures in the bistory of tbose respective unions. Union officials
have suggested that, in a union of over two million members, tbere migbt be enough
"business" to keep all tbree headquarters and all three education centers open.^ This
would significantly increase the cost ofthe unification and, at least in terms ofthe head-
quarters buildings, is probably an unlikely scenario.
In the end, these may prove to be difficult issues to resolve. Proof tbat the parties
think this may be tbe case can be found in tbe agreement tbe IAM, UAW, and USW
bave made to leave tbe resolution of some particularly tbomy issues unresolved until
tbe end of tbe unification process. Among tbose issues are wbo will be president of tbe
new union, wbat will the new union be named, and where will it be headquartered
(USW, Unification News, Spring 1996; Interview, 1999).
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Union Functions and Services. It is somewhat ironic that while the IAM, UAW,
and USW face a large number of significant issues in their efforts to unify, relatively
few of these directly involve such basic union functions and services as organizing,
political action, and collective bargaining. This may be because increasing the collec-
tive effectiveness of the three unions in these areas is the driving force bebind the effort
to unify. It is here that the potential benefits of tbe merger are readily apparent. Tbese
benefits appear to greatly exceed tbe costs.
Altbougb formal unification bas not yet taken place, tbe tbree unions bave begun
to work togetber in a number of areas. One of the most notable of these areas of coop-
eration is organizing. In July 1996, the tbree unions signed an agreement to form
"Unification Organizing Committees (UOCs)" (UAW, 1996). Tbe agreement commit-
ted the unions to pooling their talents and resources in a number of selected organiz-
ing campaigns.
In these campaigns, the three unions would file joint representation petitions with
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on bebalf of tbe new bargaining units.
One of tbe unions would be designated as tbe "lead" union for the unit. That union
would coordinate tbe efforts of all three unions. The lead union would also have chief
responsibility for negotiating tbe first contract if tbe election is successful and would
provide tbe day-to-day servicing of tbe bargaining unit. Under tbis agreement tbe
employees in the new bargaining unit would be eligible for membersbip in the lead
union, and the lead union would receive all dues paid by tbose members (IAM, 1996).
Tbe first systematic attempt at joint UOC organizing was initiated in 1997 in tbe
St. Louis area. Tbe IAM, UAW, and USW assigned several organizers from tbeir staffs
to participate in tbis pilot project. St. Louis was cbosen because all three unions have
a substantial presence in this area, witb a total membersbip of several tbousand. Tbis
was critical because an important part of tbe joint organizing strategy involves getting
local union members actively involved in handbilling, bousecalls, and demonstrations
(UAW, Spring 1997).
Tbe unions see several advantages in the joint organizing approach. First, it pre-
vents the duplication of effort that occurs when tbe unions compete against one anotber
for tbe same group of workers. Second, tbey believe tbe approacb allows tbem to engage
in more effective campaigns by bringing togetber tbe power, resources, and talents of
the tbree unions. Tbird, tbey believe tbat baving tbe support of tbe tbree unions behind
them will lead to more success in bargaining first contracts. And last, the campaigns
bring together organizers, staff, and members of the different unions for a common
purpose. The unions believe tbis creates a "bonding" experience that provides addi-
tional momentum for unification (UAW, Spring 1997).
To date, these cooperative efforts have experienced some success. The UAW
reported that the St. Louis-based UOC won more elections in tbe first four montbs of
1998 tban it bad won in tbe previous year. In Marcb and April alone tbe UOC won bar-
gaining rigbts for 1,500 workers. Altogether, the UOC has been involved in 15-20 cam-
paigns. Most of tbese campaigns bave involved workers in tbe manufacturing or service
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sectors (bus drivers, refuse baulers, and credit union employees). Given tbe perform-
ance of tbe UOCs, tbe unions plan to continue, and even expand, tbem in tbe years
leading up to unification (UAW, 1998; Ginsbacb, 1998, p. 28).
Perbaps more tban anything else, the unification effort is driven by a recognition
on tbe part of tbe tbree unions that they cannot effectively confront today's global mega-
corporations without increasing their bargaining power. Tbe "mega-union" tbat would
be created through unification is an effort to help rectify this situation.
The three unions believe that a merger will give them additional leverage at the
negotiating table by instantly increasing the extent of their representation in metal-
related industries such as aerospace, auto and auto parts production, and metal manu-
facturing and fabrication; by increasing their effectiveness in organizing new workers
through the pooling of resources; and by acbieving a unified structure for bargaining
wbicb will help them match the power of the employers with wbich tbey must deal. Tbe
leaders of tbe three unions have cited IG Metall, tbe giant German metalworkers' union,
as a model for tbe new organization.^
As presently constituted, tbe three unions differ in how they approach bargaining
witb employers. Tbe UAW bas tbe most bighly structured and centralized system of tbe
tbree unions. Tbis system includes councils of local unions, Intemational union depart-
ments, and staff members wbo specialize in relationsbips witb eacb of tbe "Big Three"
automakers (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler). They also bave specialized groups
for otber sectors witb wbicb tbey bargain, including agricultural implements; aero-
space; and tecbnical, office, and professional. Currently, tbe UAW is tbe signatory to
rougbly 2,000 labor agreements.
Tbe USW, wbile less stmctured and centralized, also involves its locals in com-
pany-wide and industry-wide bargaining groups to a significant extent, usually under
the direction of an Intemational official. In contrast, the IAM bas traditionally been
more decentralized in their approach to bargaining. Since the election of President Buf-
fenbarger, tbe IAM bas moved toward tbe UAW and USW models by revamping its bar-
gaining structure in aerospace to acbieve better coordination among locals and more
specialized expertise among tbe union's staff. Nonetbeless, in 1999 the IAM had
approximately 5,000 contracts in effect, most of which were negotiated by local and dis-
trict lodge officials witb little or no coordination or direction from beadquarters.
One potentially important difference in the unions' approaches to collective bar-
gaining involves the role of contract ratification. In the UAW members bave a consti-
tutional rigbt to vote for any contract under wbicb tbey must work. Tbe IAM and tbe
USW bave no sucb provisions in tbeir constitutions.
A third area in which the IAM, UAW, and USW have increasingly begun to coor-
dinate tbeir efforts is political action. Not surprisingly, tbe tbree unions bave experi-
enced little difficulty in working closely togetber in tbis area. Most probably tbis is
because tbe unions sbare relatively similar political ideologies (liberal), take similar
positions on tbe major issues confronting tbem (foreign trade, tbe future of social secu-
rity and Medicare, worker and human rights, etc.), and very often support the same
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candidates for political office (mostly Democrats). Also, as suggested above, the ben-
efits of unification to the unions on tbe political front — being able to draw on a mem-
bersbip of over two million members for its lobbying efforts, electoral campaigns, and
political action committee (PAC) fund raising — are readily apparent. Tbis undoubtedly
helps the unions build support for sucb joint efforts.
One specific form tbis cooperation bas taken involves the three unions speaking
with one voice to legislators. For example, in tbe montbs following tbe 1995 announce-
ment of tbe planned merger, tbe tbree unions coordinated tbeir efforts to defeat the
Working Families Flexibility Act (H.R. 2391), also known as the "comp time" bill. In
an act tbat was symbolic of their new unity, tbe chief lobbyists for tbe IAM, UAW, and
USW together visited House Democratic leaders to articulate their opposition to the bill.
In doing so, tbey were labeled the "heavy metal team" by the Representatives they vis-
ited (UAW, 1996).
Political cooperation among the unions reached its apex in February 1999 wben
tbey came togetber in Wasbington, D.C. for tbe first Unification Legislative Conference.
Over 3,000 delegates joined together to listen to major political figures, attend work-
shops on lobbying and electoral politics, and visit Capitol Hill to lobby Congress on tbeir
joint legislative agenda. Tbe unions' leaderships deemed the conference a huge success
and reported that it provided a great opportunity to renew enthusiasm for the merger
(USW, Marching, 1999). Such events, and other cooperative ventures, play an impor-
tant role by generating momentum for unification and, not incidentally, creating expec-
tations tbat keep tbe pressure on the leaders wbo are negotiating the merger agreement.
VL Democratic Practices
The creation of a huge, new industrial union presents an opportunity to put into place
tbe best goveming practices unions bave developed to date. It is interesting to specu-
late wbat a unified union migbt look like if it were to adopt tbe best "democratic" prac-
tices of tbe tbree unions.
American unions must, according to law, operate with at least a minimum of dem-
ocratic process. The LMRDA requires that union members be provided tbe freedom to
speak, vote, and assemble in relationsbip to tbe govemment of tbeir union. It goes fur-
tber to define minimal democratic standards tbat unions must meet.
Beyond these minimal standards, unions can choose to employ or not employ a
range of democratic practices. Virtually no two unions employ the same combination
of practices. And clearly tbere is no consensus among union leaders, or among scbol-
ars, as to tbe opfimal level of democracy for a labor organization.
One relatively simple bencbmark of democratic practice is tbe degree to which
members, as opposed to leaders, are directly involved in tbe decision-making process.
Using tbis bencbmark, unions could be rated on a continuum ranging from tbose unions
in which members bave only tbe minimum involvement mandated by law (least dem-
ocratic), to tbose in which members have the most opportunities to participate (most
democratic).
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Based on tbis definition, a union that elects national officers by membership ref-
erendum would tend to fall towards tbe "more democratic" end of tbe continuum, and
unions tbat elect leaders by a vote of convention delegates would be at tbe "less dem-
ocratic" end. Another measure might be tbe percentage of leaders in a union tbat are
elected as opposed to appointed. A more democratic union migbt elect staff represen-
tatives, for example (more democratic), as opposed to appointing tbem (less demo-
cratic). Whether members bave a rigbt to vote on tbeir contract would make a union
more democratic, and one tbat does not afford members this right would be less dem-
ocratic. Finally, one migbt look at tbe rigbts members bave to appeal leadersbip deci-
sions. A process tbat gives members a chance to contest a decision before a board of
neutral outsiders might be considered more democratic than an appeals process involv-
ing a union body (wbicb migbt be bebolden in some way to tbe union's leadership).
A unified union that made an effort to incorporate as many democratic practices
as possible, using the above benchmarks, migbt adopt several specific practices. For
instance, such a union would probably cboose membership referendum for electing
Intemational officers (as tbe IAM and USW currently do) over convention election
(UAW). Staff or business representatives would be elected (as is currently done in the
IAM) and not appointed (as is the current practice in the UAW and USW). In such a
model union, all members would bave tbe rigbt to ratify any contract (as tbey do in the
UAW, but not in the IAM and USW). Finally, the union would be considered more
democratic if it adopted a "Public Review Board" using outside arbiters (as is done in
tbe UAW, but not in tbe IAM or tbe USW).
Clearly, two of the reasons unions restrict the level of membership participation
in their organizations are cost and efficiency. A union that went to the extreme of involv-
ing members in every decision (a variation of pure democracy) would probably not be
able to operate effectively and the costs of sucb a process would most likely be pro-
bibitive. Tbis becomes even more problematic in a buge union like tbe one proposed
by the IAM, UAW, and USW. Still, because of its potential size and tbe relative diver-
sity of its potential membersbip, tbere is a danger tbat the union could become bureau-
cratic and tbat the leadership could become distant and isolated from tbe membership.
Considering the implications for democratic govemment of each structural decision
made, and finding an altemative tbat strikes a balance between member involvement,
cost, and efficiency, could belp avert tbis potential problem.
The Prospects for Unification and Altemative Scenarios
A great many issues remain to be resolved before the unification of the IAM, UAW, and
USW can move forward. As discussed above, many of tbese issues involve significant
and sensitive stmctural, political, and administrative concems tbat will not be easy to
resolve. While all three unions remain officially committed to unification, given the
slow rate of progress, it appears increasingly unlikely that tbe unions will have resolved
all of tbeir differences before 2000 or even 2002.
Of the dozens of issues facing the unions, three stand out as particularly trouble-
some. One of tbe most significant structural difference the unions appear to bave is
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whether Intemational officers will be elected directly by membersbip referendum or
by delegates to tbe union convention. Tbe UAW, on many occasions, bas voiced its
strong opposition to the referendum method, while the IAM and USW are unlikely to
take the right to vote out of the hands of their members. And as this is an issue where
a compromise is difficult to envision, it looms as a major roadblock.
Another serious obstacle to unification involves wbo will be the first president of
the new union. At the time unification was proposed, the three unions expected eacb of
tbeir presidents to be at tbe point of retirement wben the new union was created.* This
meant that the unions would not have to deal witb "incumbents" and could, in essence,
start from scratch in selecting a president.
However, tbis plan was disrupted wben forty-six-year-old Tom Buffenbarger
somewbat unexpectedly sougbt, and won, tbe IAM presidency in 1997. If tbe merger
occurs in tbe next several years, Buffenbarger is likely to be in office as IAM presi-
dent. He will be relatively young at that point and, most likely, will want to remain
president of his organization. As the smallest ofthe three unions involved in the merger,
any IAM claim to the top office of the unified union could meet stiff resistance.
The third potential roadblock is less concrete tban tbe first two issues but could be
an equally significant impediment to unification. Culture is an important part of every
organization. It consists of tbe unofficial rules, procedures, and shared assumptions and
beliefs of an organization.
Union culture manifests itself in a number of ways, including tbe appreciation
members feel for tbeir union's history and the pride members feel in being associated
witb their union. It is probably fair to say tbat a significant part of tbe membersbip of
the IAM, UAW, and USW bas strong attacbments to tbeir unions. Tbese feelings could
make it difficult for members to relinquish tbeir association witb their union.^
Another dimension of union culture is tbe way a member views bimself in rela-
tion to tbe organization. Tbis issue could prove more problematic. As suggested earlier,
tbe UAW and tbe USW are usually characterized as somewhat centralized organiza-
tions, while the IAM is usually thought of as a more decentralized union. The natural
tendency of the merging unions is to replicate the kind of union-member relations tbey
had in their original organizations. The UAW and USW would likely be most com-
fortable witb a new Intemational organization tbat played a very active role in tbe lives
of its members and the functioning of its locals. In some respects, one of the main rea-
sons for unification is to bring the concentrated power of a merged union to bear on all
union functions and services. Indications are, bowever, tbat tbe IAM is very comfort-
able with its decentralized approach and, in fact, may strongly resist a UAW/USW-type
structure in the unified union.
The June 1999 announcement that the UAW and the USW would move ahead to
merge the two unions prior to a complete unification agreement suggests that the end
result of the process may be sometbing less than full unification of the three unions. A
merger of the UAW and the USW, with the IAM remaining a separate entity, is one
possibility.
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Anotber possibility, given tbe very difficult issues tbat must be resolved, is tbat tbe
unions could gradually merge tbeir operations over an extended period of time. Sucb a
transition period would enable the unions to accelerate and expand their cooperative
efforts in a number of areas while they continue to work out some of the more difficult
structural and administrative details. By continuing their joint organizing, bargaining,
and political efforts the unions can maintain the momentum for merger. The extra time
such an approach might buy could be useful in resolving sucb issues as wbo will bold
wbat polidcal office and bow will tbe duplication of staff positions be resolved. Tbe
attrition tbat would occur over a longer phase-in period would likely reduce the num-
ber of people affected by sucb decisions.
Tbere are at least two otber possible scenarios. One altemative migbt be a formal
alliance of tbe tbree unions tbat falls somewhat short of complete unification. The
unions could institutionalize their cooperative organizing, bargaining, and political
arrangements and agree to lend mutual aid and support to one another in times of dif-
ficulty. Such a confederation might offer many of tbe benefits of a merger witbout
requiring the unions to resolve the more troublesome issues. Tbe UAW bas experience
witb sucb a cooperative arrangement, having joined with the Teamsters and the United
Distributive Workers (District 65) to form tbe Alliance for Labor Action in 1968 (Cbai-
son, 1986).
Another altemative would be a less formal, cooperative arrangement wbere the
unions would continue to work together in a number of areas, but no formal agreement
would be necessary. Tbe unions could, in essence, just agree to continue the working
relationships they have developed over the last five years.
Clearly, it is too early to speculate witb any certainty as to tbe end result of this
unification effort. There are many options and avenues open to the three unions to
explore; the combinations and permutations tbat could be considered are numerous.
Tbe only certainty is tbat tbe road to unification will not be easily traversed.
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NOTES
'The full names of the three unions are Intemational Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America; United Steelworkers of America; and International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers.
^Shortly after this, the IAM, UAW, and USW announced that the process of bringing the unions together
would not be referred to as "merger" but rather "unification," signifying that the end result of the process
would be an entirely new organization. In this paper, however, the authors will use the terms interchangeably.
'Chaison (1982) has suggested that the design of goveming structures of the new organization is the most
common issue at impasse in merger negotiations. He cites case studies of mergers by Chitayak (1979), Bok
and Dunlop (1970), and Brooks and Gamm (1976).
••in the USW, the National Director of Canada is also a member of the Executive Board.
'The authors interviewed a number of intemational, district, and local officials in the course of the research
for this paper. Because ofthe sensitive nature ofthe on-going merger negotiations, those interviewed are not
identified by name.
'The possibility that two or more ofthe education centers might remain open is made more likely by the fact
that the three facilities perform different functions. Black Lake (UAW) provides family education for rank-
and-file leaders. The Winpisinger Center (IAM) offers mostly staff training, while the USW Center offers a
combination of both rank-and-file leader and staff training.
'See Craypo (1986, pp. 20-47) for a discussion of "the unions ability to make the employer pay" in which
he translates classical economic theory which deals with the employer's ability to pay into a unionized set-
ting. Unions have power to the extent that they represent the relevant work force, eliminate competitive
unions, and achieve the appropriate bargaining structure.
*It is noteworthy that the IAM, UAW, and USW are among the minority of unions which have required their
presidents to retire at age 65.
'Each of these unions has a strong identity that has its roots in their histories. The UAW, for example, has a
proud history of social unionism and militance that they probably feel is not shared by the other two unions.
The IAM, on the other hand, has its roots in craft unionism. Undoubtedly, a significant portion of IAM mem-
bers view themselves as skilled, rather than industrial, workers.
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